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Speech of Senator Mi~e Mansfield {D•, Montana) 
For Release --
BEYOND FORMOSA 
During l'Cccnt years the United States has been confronted with a sue-
cession of crises in Asia. None has been mor~ complex than the one which we 
now face in Formosa. I should like to begin this discussion therefore by review-
ing the background of our present involvement in that region. 
When the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949, 
the government of the Republic of China moved to Formosa. The United States 
continued to recognize that government and only that government. Since the 
outbreak of communist aggression in Korea, almost five years ago, our 
military forces have been committed to preventing the Chinese Communists from 
seizing Formosa. This policy, instituted by former President Truman, has had 
the continuing support of Congress. It has also had the overwhelming support of 
both great political parties. 
Last ye1'!.r, in December, the Secretary of State concluded a defense 
treaty with the Republic of China which had the effect of formally acknowledging 
this policy. For some reason, which in my opinion has never been satisfactorily 
explained, the President saw fit not to wait for the Senate's consent to ratification 
of that treaty. Instead, in the interim, he sent to the Congress a joint resolution 
on the Defense of Formosa. The resolution neither added to nor subtracted from 
the terms of the defense treaty which was subsequently ratified. 
In debating the Formosa Resolution in the Senate there was no question 
of the determination of that body that Formosa should be defended. That was 
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never at issue . The debate, rather, centered on two other questions. "'ne was 
the question of whether Congress should endorse in advance a possible American 
military action in the Fo!"mosan Straits and on the Chinese mainland, nets over 
which Congress could have no control and the validity of which it could have no 
way of determining. 1 stated at the time that in my judgment under the Constitu-
tion only Ccngres s had the power to declare war but that short of war the 
President had powers to act as Commander-in-Chief and in the execution of 
foreign policy. 1 further stated that his powers and his r esponsiDility in the 
latter connection could not be diluted, obscured, trander red, or divided, 
resolutions of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. After the P resident 
gave assurances, in effect, that he alone would assume responnibility for any use_ 
of force in the Formosan region, without a de:::laration o f war, the resolution wa 
accepted by the Senate . Had we not had thuse Presidential assurances, that 
resolution would have been an open invitation to irresponsibility and might very 
well have been rejected by the .3enate. 
The second side-issue in the Formosan debate was the relation of the 
coastal islands of the Quemoys and the 1Viatsus to the safeguarding of Formosa. 
In this discussion the Senate was atteMpting to place the defense of the coastal 
islands -- in the perspective of our national interests rather than those of the 
Chinese nationalist government, In consequence, it was clear by the time the 
resolution paused that Congress supported the defense of Formosa and nothing 
more. We were nut approving any military crusade on the mainland o£ Asia o r 
any defense of the off-shore islands for the sake of the off-shore islands. T !<.now 
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that my own vote was cast with that understanding and I so stated. Many other 
members of the Senate expressed similar sentiments. 
The responsibility for carrying out the defense of Formosa -- and it is 
a heavy burden -- remains the responsibility of the President. It seems to me 
that the best way that Americans can lighten that burden is by refraining at this 
time from attempts to whittle away at his responsibility. The President is 
entrusted with the defense of Formosa. It is for him to decide whether to defend 
the coastal islands or to engage our forces in their defense. He is accountable 
to the American people for whatever action he may or may not take. But to 
attempt to tie his hands now, in advance, either for or against their defense, 
will serve only to deepen the difficult crisis in which we find ourselves. 
It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that ~he Formosan resolution, if it 
had to come to Congress at all, came in the vague fashion that it did. Once 
having been made public, however, Congress was faced with little alternative 
but to accept it in that form or weaken the President's position in dealing with 
the Far Eastern crisis. 
My concern today is not with predicting the outcome of the Formosan 
crisis. I do not know whether the vagueness of our position on the coastal 
islands will either avert war or plunge us into war. No one can make a meaning-
ful prediction of that kind. I believe that remains the case despite the growing 
prospects of peace talks between the United States and the Communists. These 
talks, in my opinion, should not be ruled out but they should he ~pproached •vitll 
the greatest caution, 
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I would address the main body of my remarks today to the proposition 
that the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, respecting the Cuemoya an 
the Matsus is merely an external symptom of our problems in the Far East. Th< 
underlying causes fo r these problems are to be found in fo rces and pressures 
which exist inside the body of Asia. They are also to be found in pressures and 
forces which are exerted from outside .Asia. If there is to be peace in that part 
of the world - - if there are to be long - term solutions in Asia, it is to these 
causes that our attention must be turned. It is of importance that we understand 
not only what these forces are but what happens in Asia when the pressures from 
outside the Continent collide with those from within. In particular it is of im-
portance that the role of military force in our policy in Asia be examined -- not 
so much from the standpoint of its use as an ultimate recourse in war but its 
role as a deterrent before war breaks out. That is the way we have been called 
upon to use it, except in Korea, since the end of Vlorld War II. 
The crisis in the Formosan Straits is not an isolated incident. It is 
part of a chain teaction identified with last year's crisis in Indochina and before 
that with the crisis in Korea. In dealing with the crisis in Formosa our attention 
is easily diverted from developments which next year may result in a crisis in 
Laos, Thailand and Indonesia. By the following year, if not sooner, the crisis 
of Japan may be full upon us. 
The inter -related problems in Asia include the conspicuous threats of 
communist territorial expansion , in Korea, Indochina, and Formosa. It also is 
interwoven, howev~r, wit:}' 1 CPs -evirief't tht'eats . The,..~ ; Q pr"!BBurc witHn Japar 
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for an expansion of trade, To the extent that this pressure seeks an outlet in 
closer economic and cultural relations with the Chinese mainland, it affects 
the unity of policy among members of the free world with respect to Communist 
China. There is also a mounting pres sure among the so-called neutral states 
of South Asia for peaceful relations with Communist China. The attitude of 
these states towards developments in Formosa must be seen in the context of 
that broader consideration. In considering the totality of our situation in Asia, 
moreover, we cannot ignore the possibility that the outbreak of hostilities in 
the Chinese coastal islands could signalize a resumption of hostilities in Korea 
and Indochina. Finally, behind the complex of these factors in Asia we must 
also reckon with the relationship between the actions of Communist China and 
the policy of the Soviet Union, 
During recent years we have been attempting to deal with these various 
pressures largely by economic and military means and sometimes in a seemingly 
disconnected fashion, We have contributed to the economic development of the 
free countries of Asia. We have attempted at the same time to strengthen the 
defenses of the free-Asian countries. These positive efforts have been dimmed, 
however, by the recurrent crises. From the Korean crisis we rushed too late 
to Indochina to quench a fire which had spread beyond control. We now have 
rushed to the fire in Formosa. We may be blinded by the glare in Formosa to 
the fire which is being kindled in Japan. We have exercised in recent years a 
kind of "chain reaction" diplomacy, a kind of crisis-foreign policy. VIe have 
jumped from the effects of one crisis to its successor. We !1ave , in short, never 
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been ahead of the game. That the crises continue to occur seerns to me evtdcnce 
that either our positive measures have been insufficient or the situation has been 
beyond our control by measures which we could support at that t1me. 1 thin tit 
is probably a little o f both . There arc limits to what we can do to control the 
flow of events in Asia, short of war and even with war. 
That does not mean our answer is to pick up our marbles and go homo. 
Asia is too ir.1portant to us, to our security and to our other national interests 
to permit that kind of response . That would sir.1ply amount to poDtponing the day 
of reckoning. 
''le have not exhausted our possibilities of dealing with the situation 
when we employ measures of economic aid and .nilitary aid. It seems to me we 
have ove rlookcd another which costs far less and yet can be .-·nore far- reaching 
in its effect . 
That ingredient I believe lies in the real r.1 of attitudes and ideas. I an 
not talking about psychological warfare which holds that you can win with tricky 
words and slick advertising slogans battles which cannot be won with infantry 
rifles. I think the lesson of the unleashing of Chiang has put to rest that 
fallacious concept . But if the battle in Asia is essentially a struggle of ideas 
it is in the spirit as well as in the economic and military arena wherein peace 
and long tel'm solutions may possibly be found. 
What I a :n suggesting is that we examine the Asian attitudes or states 
of mind which give rise to many of the basic pressures with which we must 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 59, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
cf mind and our actions. :?erhaps, then, we will find some of the answers to 
the peace we see1.~ . Such answers will not lead to a purchased peace, or a 
power peace. They could, however, lead to a peace based on mutual under-
standing and co mr.1on interest. 
··re have grown too accustomed to wrapping all the ills of Asia into the 
single package mar!ced " r .. 1ilitant co-:n ;.-;1 unism". Of course this threat exists; 
we have seen over SOC m illion Chinese brought under the potential influence of 
that ideolgy. Countless millions r.,o re are threatened with it. Y!e have spent 
blood to prevent the conquest of Korea by c ommunist aggression. Too late, 
we saw Vietnam north of the 17th parallel brcught within the orbit of communism. 
We have seen m ilitant communist expansionis :I": acco mpanied by political 
penetration, by organized propaganda, by the activities of disciplined cadres 
of intimidators and by calculated economic penetration. Military offensives 
have been alternated with the allurements of the peace offensive with its offers 
of trade, industrialization and cultural exchanges . Today in Free Vietnam we 
see Vietr:1inh agents using blac:cmail, bribery and intim idation in attempting to 
undermine the Diem govern.tnent . , '.'e see the Comr.-mnist created shadow govern-
ment of Fathet Lao in northern Laos and another co ~-nmunist penetration headed 
by a for m er Premier of Thailand, Pridi, in Southeast P. sia. •:re see the new 
maps of China which brazenly incorporate territory from its southern neighbors. 
We see new military highways under constructio n in south China. In Indonesia 
the Communist party has recently been reorganized and its activities accelerated. 
The trade offensive directed at Japan is '.:> cginning to cause a wavering in that 
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country. In North Korea the truce has been violated and the area has been 
placed within a stranglehold of Communist control. And now, the Communist 
sword is pointed at Formosa. It is all too e\'idcnt that militant communism 
is a force in Asia. But why, we may well ask ourselves, has it not met with 
more resistance? Why hasn't Asian nationalism which in great measure was 
1timulated by our own revolution interposed a more formidable bulwark to the 
communist advance? \'le have assumed in recent years that by taking measures 
to alleviate the extreme poverty of Asia, we might guide A sian nationalism 
toward our own precepts of democracy. We have also assumed that by arming 
it heavily we could prevent a communist penetration. These efforts have not 
been conspicuously successful. Perhaps, in part, the difficulty lies in the 
failure to recognize the spiritual basis of Asian nationalism. 
The peoples of Asia, looking out on the West , see the high material 
standard of living which has followed in the wake of the industrial r evolution. 
Asia was left in the backwash by the sweep of western industrialism. The surge 
of democracy which spread throug!l Europe and the Americas following our revo • 
lution and the French Revolution by-passed Asia at that time. In consequence, as 
the decades passed the differences between eastern and western standards of liv· 
ing widened, as did the gap between the political controllers and the controlled in 
Asia. For more than a century these differences burned deeper and deeper in the 
hearts and minds of the peoples of the Orient. The bitterness was fed not only by 
the desire for the material achievements of the West but also by the dcm::mda of 
pride and prestige. Although the "#est brough:: so:ne benefit,;, the era of 
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colonialism was widely viewed in Asia as hampering the development of the 
peoples of Asia in their own right. Colonialism was backed by western force 
and in the minds of many Asians, force is indelibly identified with their ancient 
and deep-seated grievances against that system, 
Although the era of colonialism is almost over in Asia, its after-effects 
remain, There is extreme sensitivity among Asians and especially among 
Asian leaders about being recognized and dealt with on a basis of absolute 
equality by the West. There is an urge to express their new-found independence 
in independent action, An enthusiasm also exists for rapid economic develop-
ment --a desire to bridge the wide economic gap --between the East and West. 
At the same time, however, dependence upon the V'est for economic aid contra-
dicts the underlying urge of the Asian nations to prove their independence and 
equality, There exists most of all an ever-present sensitivity, an often 
unreasonable sensitivity, to any action which resembles a return of the colonial 
relationships of an earlier era. 
In this context it is understandable that Communist China's defiance of 
the West finds considerable emotional support from many Asians including 
those who staunchly oppose com munism. It explains in part the support of some 
Asian governm ents for the recognition of Communist China and for its admission 
to the United Nations. It is an important element in explaining the initial 
successes of the Vi.etminh in Indochina. The deep-seated attitudes of Asia toward 
the West form an emotional and psychological base which is readily exploited by 
Communist propaganda, An understanding of this fact is pertinent to any under-
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standing of the behavior of the uncommitted states of Ana, behavior which 
sometimes appears and is hostile to us . 
As Asians look at the West from these attitudes, and particularly o.s 
they view the United States there is a tendency for many of them to interpret 
present U. S. policy as a policy of force. To them we exaggerate the value of 
force. 
And they identify force with the era of foreign domination in Asia against 
which present Asian nationalism rebels. When we announce a po licy of massive 
retaliation it places force in the forefront rather than in the position of an 
ultimate recourse where it should rightly be, In the minds of many people 
throughout Asia our emphasis on force rules out of the foreground the normal 
and accepted processes of negotiation in human relations. It undermines our 
dignity and our prestige . For the mightiest power on the face of the earth to 
flaunt its strength in this manner is readily interpreted in Asia in the light of a 
man who threatens to shoot his neighbor, if the latter's cow comes into his 
pasture rather than to discuss the problem of mending the fence. To be su rc 
the reactions vary in different parts of Asia but I think it is correct to say that 
Asians in general, including the Chinese people -- in spite of the recent 
actions of their rulers -- are a peaceful people and they tend to admire the 
strong who are also peaceful. Much of the great respect which this country 
enjoyed in the past derived from that fact: President Theodore Roosevelt's 
admonition to "speak softly but carry a big stick" won us a great backlog of 
goodwill in Asia. This sensible advice seems to have been forgotten by a great 
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number of Americans who otherwise have every cause to admire Theodore 
Roosevelt. 
Those who know the peoples of Asia can attest to the great emphasis 
which they place on negotiation. A spirit of negotiation permeates their everyday 
life; it involves adjustments and give-and-take and inevitably is accompanied by 
prolonged discussion. Those who know Asia will also attest to the lack of the 
visible use of force in the everyday relations among Asians . 
Closely related is a concept found in many parts of Asia which in effect 
holds that there is a positive force in a negative action. We see this in the 
philosophy of Chinese Taoism - - we see it in what often appears to us to be the 
retiring or reticent traits of many Asian peoples -- we see it in the Chinese 
concept employed even by the Chinese Communists, of "advancing by withdrawing" 
-- we have seen it in India in the passive resistance doctrine of Mahatma Gandhi. 
It is reflected now in the arguments of the Asian neutrals . We see it in the 
Jiu Jitsu sport and the doctrine of Judo in Japan in which one utilizes the offensive 
force of his opponent to his own advantage. There are , of course, counter-
doctrines in Asia which place great emphasis on force, and we should not forget 
them, but examples serve to illustrate an attitude which is of the highest 
importance in understanding the international policies of the Asian nations. 
The mention of the possible use of atomic tactical weapons in the 
defense of Formosa is often interpreted there as further evidence of United States 
reliance on force. Instead of enhancing the strength of our position it has the 
eHcct o! an admissi.on that we are incapable o! copin~ w~th .. l,.,. qituation on a 
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plane of reason and have been driven m the fast round to dependence upon an 
ultimate recourse. 
I:f there is any one factor responsible for di a agreement m our relation• 
with India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon it is lhe view of U1eir leaders that 
primary reliance on force is not the best means of gaining solutions in Asia. 
They advance the view that we can prevent communist aggression but 
m preventing the aggression it is not necessary to exercise pressures which 
rule out a climate of negotiation. We may find this attitude unrealistic and in 
some cases, I believe, correctly so. What is important, however, is to recog-
nize its existence and, if we are not intent upon isolating ourselves, to accommo-
date our policies, wherever possible, to it. There is no sense in getting furious 
about it or losing our temper over it. To do so may give us a momentary sense 
of satisfaction but it is not going to serve our national interests. 
Most Asian nations acquiesced in the action of the United States in 
neutralizing the Formosa Straits at the beginning of the Korean War. At the 
beginning of 1953, however, neutralization was replaced by a boastful policy of 
"unleashing" the Chinese nationalist forces. '\'ith few exceptions this second 
step was interpreted by the free states of Asia as provocative -- as putting the 
United States in position of reliance on force to the exclusion of other means. 
' '/hat then should be the role of force in our policy in Asia? We know 
that in all realism no great power, least of all the United States, can afford at 
present to abandon or weaken its military power. We must continue the system 
"£ military alli;,.nc:ee ;~ thP ""''ester~ Pt\.-:Hir. Southe:ut A•ia anti t'h• "1.-!ar EAst. 
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Let us by all means continue to naintain and strengthen our military defenses 
in the Far East. Is it not however in the interest of peace in Asia, and in our 
own national interest, that we relegate the use of force to the background? Is it 
not in our interest to explore measures which offer some hope of leading to long-
term solutions? Are there measures which will obtain these solutions? I believe 
there are. 
As a first measure it seems to me eo sential that we keep clearly in mind 
that our national interest in the Formosan area is the defense of Formosa and 
the Pescadores not that of the off- shore islands of the Quemoys and the Mats us. 
Any defense of the coastal islands, which always have been a part of China and 
so involved in the Chinese civil war is incidental to our primary aim. President 
Eisenhower, in submitting the Formosa resolution to Congress, only hinted at a 
possible defense of the coastal islands while urging that a cease-fire be 
negotiated. That should remain our immediate objective and there are signs 
now that we may be moving towards its achievement. 
VTe cannot fail to recognize in this situation that threats to peace are 
posed by the Chinese on both sides of the Formosa Straits . The Republic of 
China on Formosa has repeatedly avowed its intention of regaining the mainland. 
The United States must come to grips with that threat since we are linked in a 
defense alliance with the Republic. Assuming that liberation of the mainland by 
force were militarily feasible -- and it is not even conceivable short of commit-
ting this country to an all - out war on the continent of Asia -- would the peopl e of 
the United States support the use of force as an instrument of national policy for 
-
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the hbcratlon of China? 1 thinl~ not. Is 1t bC)'Ond our tmagtnatton to concch e 
of Chma being ultimately !reed from totalitartan communum by other me n ? 
Have we so little falth in the power of freedo n? The Chinese people ho.ve 
turned out their oppressors many times . Is 1t inconceivable that they wtll not 
do so again? 
The national gover•1ment of China deserves every reasonable considera-
tion fro m this count1·y . First considerntion must be given, however, to our 
national needs and our needs arc not served by an embroilment in a war to 
liberate the Chinese mainland. I think it is time to recognize the tragic blunder 
of "unleashing" Generalissimo Chiang Kai - shek and building up his expectations 
that we would return him to the ~ainland . That was a cruel and misleading thing 
to do and I thin!< we ought to ac:mowlcdge the error . I do not think we ought to 
cor:1pound it, 
Once we have returned to the policy of neutralization, the policy adopted 
in 1950, we will have laid the groundwork for international action to counter the 
threat of the Chinese communists . 
The United States can then and only then, on sound moral and legal 
grounds, insist that other free nations join with us in opposition to the use of any 
aggressive force in the For mosa area . Such a declaration made perhaps by the 
United Nations Assembly could call on both the Chinese Communists and the 
Nationalists to abstain from the use of force . Once our own purposes arc clear, 
I believe that many, if not most countries outsic!e the Communist bloc v.ould 
support a declaration condemning an attack by either side in the Chinese t:onGic t. 
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Such a declaration would unite those nations who now oppose Communist military 
action against Formosa but who are unwilling to give either moral or actual 
support to the defense of the island so long as the Chinese national government 
continues to threaten to invade the mainland. Such a declaration having been 
made, the question of the defense of the coastal islands would become a question 
for international determination. It would no longer be a responsibility for the 
President of the United States alone. By taking this action the peoples of Asia 
would be given a clear and forthright commitment that our position respecting 
Formosa involved resort to force not in a trigger-happy fashion but force as a 
last recourse. At the sam e time, we would not have budged one inch in our 
determination to prevent Communist seizure of Formosa. 
Neutralization of the Straits, however important, is only a first 
positive step toward a solution of the problem of Formosa. A determination of 
the status of Formosa is complicated not only by questions of international law 
but by considerations contained in the regrettable but realistic fact that the 
Republic of China on Formosa is not now and short of total war has little hope of 
becoming the government of the mainland of China . So long as two Chinese 
governments, one on Formosa and one on the mainland claim jurisdiction over 
all of China, there exists not only civil wa1· but a threat to world peace - - the 
seeds of total war. 
A number of possible solutions to this problem have been advanced. The 
establishment of an independent republic on Formosa by declaration of thP. present 
governmen~ wonlrJ be realistic but is not a likel:r rlP.velopment. ~ ?lE.biscite of 
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the people of Formosa has been suggcste8 to determine then ishes m thu 
matter. Further proposals have been made to the effect that Formosa be 
placed under a trusteeship with its integrity guaranteed for a d signated period 
of years. These envisage a trusteeship either by a single Pacific nation, by a 
consortium of powers or by the United Nations. In addition to these proposals 
there are undoubtedly solutions as yet unexplored. All such proposals require 
patient and thorough examination. 
A settlement of the status of Formosa would permit our full energies 
to be directed toward the many problems of our peaceful relations with the 
Asian nations. For many years now we have thought of the world as being 
divided into two parts -- the Free V'orld and the Communist World. These 
words have become a part of our everyday larguage. Yet we arc now coming to 
recognize the width and depth of the chasm which exists within the free world. 
There is a gulf which may be of greater long-range significance than the 
immediate threat of communism. In terms of economics the gulf is between 
those states which have a high material standard of living and those which are 
struggling to rise from the level of recurrent fa rtline; it is an abyss which 
separates automation fro :-n the man-drawn plow. 
It is not enough that we build a wall to contain communism, for while 
we build the wall the chasms within the free world deepen. I am suggesting that 
we continue to maintain our defense system in the Far East but that in the fore-
ground our energy and "nt~l\Pct anrl t"esourccs !.>e di.,.Prted toward buil~ing 
bridges acl'os s the chasms in the free world. 
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It will take more than what we now call technical assistance and 
economic aid. If the gap is to be bridged the concept of "aid" must be replaced 
by a unity of purpose . The challenge is to move into spheres of economic and 
cultural cooperation in which the common progress of all free nations becomes 
possible. If we are equal to that challenge, and if we have the patience and under-
standing to stay with it, we need have no fear of the outcome of this contes t 
between totalitarian communism and freedom - - in Asia, in Europe or anywher e 
else. 
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